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Nikolai Gochev (Sofia) 
ATHENS AND THE UNITY OF THE GREEK COMMUNITY  
AT THE END OF THE CLASSICAL EPOCH 
(An Essay on the Political Speeches by Demosthenes)1 
United in Diversity 
     (Motto of the first EU Constitution)2 
 
The purpose of this text is to examine to what extent the Greeks from the 
second half of IV century BC had been unified and what kind of a unity 
had it been. Still, on the other side, the text refers to the situation of con-
temporary Europe. The past two weeks have revealed, that the Europeans 
are not sure, that they wish to live in one state, or even in a union, which 
might resemble a state.3 This raises a concern in those among them, who 
have believed during the previous 50 years, that the existence of such a 
state will be for good and who have devoted their efforts for its creation, 
or who merely have hoped it to appear. The concern is not smaller for 
those, who, for the time being, live outside the political boundaries of 
what is going to become such a state, but who wish to be part of it.4  
Now it becomes clear, that there are many citizens of the European 
states, who have cooperated, agreed, or at least endured the establishment 
of this union. However, lately they have said that they are not going to 
                                                 
1  The text had been read as a paper at the International Symposium European Integration 
in Philosophical Perspective organised by Italian Cultural Institute in Sofia and the Fa-
culty of Philosophy at Sofia University (June 10-11, 2005).  
2  http://www.eurominority.eu/version/fra/languages-motto.asp 
3  The EU Constitution Treaty was rejected in France (May, 2005) and in the Netherlands 
(June, 2005) and postponed indefinitely in Ireland (June, 2005). 
4  I mean primarily most of the citizens of the candidates Bulgaria and Romania, accord-
ing to the opinion polls.  
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cooperate and even endure any more. The question is: how much united 
might be Europe? And to add: how big might be Europe, and still remain 
united? And is it possible for Europe to be united not to the extent, pre-
sumed by the Constitution and even not to the present-day extent, and 
nevertheless remain peaceful and free? I will make an attempt to consider 
these questions with the help of what had happened in Greece at the end 
of the epoch of the free city states.  
Greece during the IV century BC and earlier as well, had suffered difficul-
ties with its unity. Sometimes it had striven to be united, but it had never 
achieved that, except for rare occasions, partly and for a limited time. So, I 
am going to take a look at these difficulties, which seem to me not quite 
different from the ones we encounter today, and I will do this with the 
help of what Demosthenes had stated in his speeches.         
Demosthenes’ Cause 
Demosthenes remained in the history primarily with his struggle against 
the Macedonian political and military treat. He argued for the necessity of 
an active and unified Greek resistance against Philip, who by that time 
seemed quite ambitious and unlikely to be satisfied solely with conquer-
ing South Thrace and North Greece up to Thessalia. Still, in his earlier po-
litical speeches it is evident that he could embrace such a cause on other 
occasion as well. In his On the Symmoriai the subject is the need of an in-
tensified military preparation against the Persian threat; and in On the 
Liberty of the Citizens of Rhodes he pleads for an immediate military interfe-
rence in Rhodes, where the democracy had be re-established and the local 
oligarchs – removed, since they had been dependent on the queen of Caria 
Artemisia (the widow of the famous Mausol).  
The Greek cities, according to Demosthenes, each by itself and all of 
them together, are threaten by a barbarian invasion. It seems that the dan-
ger of the barbarian invasion is not that much in the war damages (the 
Greeks themselves mutually caused enough such damages to one another, 
especially since the beginning of the Peloponnesian war). The danger is 
that it destroys the liberty – with certainty and maybe forever. It is so be-
cause the barbarians are not familiar with the democracy. They are always 
subjects of a monarchy equal to tyranny.5 But, on the other hand, even if 
some Greeks are in principle not against monarchy or oligarchy, they nec-
                                                 
5  Curiously, Demosthenes does not use the distinction ‘a tyrant – a king’, which had 
been employed by almost all influential political thinkers, including Aristotle. Maybe 
for him all kinds of monarchy are undesirable. 
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essarily should have been worried by the risk to be conquered of the bar-
barian – which is something shameful in principle.  
The Greeks are unable to reject separately the pressure of the strong 
barbarian states, and that’s why they need a union. This union has to have 
an initiator, which at the same time should possess the potential of being a 
leader. We should admit, says Demosthenes, that Athens is strong enough 
as a city, in order to be a leader. Moreover, it had already been a leader. 
And more. Athens, being a democratic city-state, could guarantee the 
freedom of all the Greeks, even if it will be accepted as the only leader, 
because it never supports tyrants and oligarchs, but offers even to its op-
position self-governing (democracy). 
So, Demosthenes is a speaker of those Athenians who see their city as 
the adequate leader of all Greeks, standing in front of a serious and per-
manent external military threat. The unity, which he is advocating, is a 
must, if the Greeks want to evade the yoke at all. For the time, that is the 
only reason to create this union.  
The Balance of Powers 
When speaking about Athens as a leader and initiator of the Greek union, 
Demosthenes refers to a kind of tradition in the Greek history during the 
last 140-150 years. This is the tradition of the unions, appointing cities, 
which are supposed to become ‘patrons of the Greeks’. In the times before 
the Persian march against the European Greeks, the polises had been al-
ways disunited. They never established great unions (excluding the Trojan 
precedent) and they lead regular, although insignificant wars against each 
other. Moreover they had been too much occupied with internal political 
struggles, which impeded the consistent diplomatic activity and made all 
unions and pacts unreliable. So it could be assumed, that the first time the 
Greeks began to consider a union, it was during the Ionian revolt against 
Persia, which then reigned over the Greeks of Asia Minor through tyrants, 
controlled by the King. This union might succeed and keep the indepen-
dence of the Asian Greeks, if it had been more resistant. However, in a 
fatal sea battle near Miletus, the Greeks had been defeated. Herodotus 
claims (VI, 14), that it had been the fault of the men from Samos: they had 
been strong in the naval affairs, but suddenly they betrayed their position 
and left the united navy. After the suppression of the revolt they remained 
dependent on the Persians but managed to keep the island and its inhabi-
tants safe and secure (VI, 25). This union had not a distinguished leader, 
but had an initiator – the polis of Miletus, then lead by the tyrant Aristago-
ras, who, like his predecessor and relative Histiaeus, came to power not 
without the consent of Darius (V, 23-35). 
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The next union appeared after the victories of the European Greeks in 
490 and 480. It had been more lasting, having a strong leader – Athens, 
which won almost alone the important battles at Marathon and Salamis. 
After the second victory the Athenians enforced the democracy in their 
city; they launched an anti-Persian union, embracing many islands and 
continental cities outside Peloponnese and allocated a relatively large 
budget of the union. Later they privatized the right to manage this budget 
almost unaccountably (Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 23-24). Thus 
Athens acquired extraordinary wealth, and no city could leave the union 
without the consent of the Athenians, although they had seen how their 
money is spent. The most serious separatist attempt had been made by the 
state of Samos, but Athens had been powerful enough to attack the island 
and suppress the revolt (Plutarch, Pericles, 25). 
Thus the Athenians lost credibility among the majority of the Greeks 
and provoked the anger of Sparta. This enmity seems to be the chief rea-
son for the Peloponnesian war (Thucydides, I, 23). The claims of Athens 
during all these 60-70 years after the Peloponnesian wars had grown too 
much and they had intended not only to preserve the union, but also even 
to expand their influence far beyond the Aegean Sea (Thucydides, VI, 1; 
Plutarch, Alcibiades, 17). They aspired to a kind of empire, which had to 
include all the Greeks and not only them. However, they had been de-
feated in this war and thus a project for the unification of Greece had col-
lapsed at the end of the V century.  
Athens from the middle of the V century is proud with its political 
model and its successes, as can be heard by Thucydides (II, 35-46). There 
Pericles points to the advantages of the city compared to Sparta. Athens, 
100 years later, in the middle of the IV BC, continues to insist on the merits 
of democracy, but already sees itself more as a political and ideological 
guide, advising the Greeks to follow its example as a defender of Greek 
independency against non-Greeks (Persians, Macedonians). Hence, it is 
not going to be a patron, demanding obedience from other polises, but 
rather a center of the resistance against barbarians and a guarantee for the 
independence of any Greek city. In brief, Athens doesn`t want an empire 
for itself, but a union of independent states. This union might engender a 
military union upon necessity, but provided that the separate states will 
remain sovereign. 
When speaking on these matters, Demosthenes has in mind the devel-
opments after the end of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedaemonians did 
not allow the devastation of Athens, because probably they have been 
aware of the fact, that it would have lead only to a change of the rival city. 
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Then the center of the influence from the North would have moved to 
Thebes, Corinth or even to their old rival Argos. For them an oligarchic 
and controlled from outside Athens had been more suitable. Or maybe 
they just feared the very sharp change in the entire Greek world, which 
might be provoked by the disappearance of such a powerful state. 
However, only ten years after that (394 BC) the Lacedaemonians had to 
fight against a coalition of several cities, one of which again had been de-
mocratized and recovering Athens. Then they needed the support of the 
Persian king. After another twenty years (371 BC) they had been greatly 
and scandalously defeated by Thebes. This unexpected victory rendered 
Thebes so mighty, that now the Spartans themselves had been threatened 
with destruction. But then Athens supported them against Thebans. Thus 
the balance of the powers had been kept once more and it had begun to 
shape out that the polises will never allow any of them to acquire excep-
tional domination. It was obvious that a stable union between the most 
influential cities was rather impossible, and even the preserving the status 
quo (a politically multi-polar Greek world) inevitably leaded to new wars. 
Nevertheless, all that wouldn`t look so horrifying, if Philip of Macedonia 
had limited himself with the control over the territories between the 
Adriatic Sea, Thessalia and the Black Sea coasts. But it had been evident 
that he is eager for more.   
The Failure of Athens 
Demosthenes himself seems to hold the opinion that Athens is already 
decaying as political and military force and therefore does not possess 
sufficient potential for the struggle against Macedonia. Besides, the mood 
in the different speeches is different: prior to the entrance of Philip in Pho-
cis and even more before the capture of Olynthus, Philip seems threaten-
ing, but still fightable. But after his march to the south of the Thermopylae 
it becomes clear, that the capacities of the Athenians to confront him are 
suspicious, and, what is even worse, that the peace already seems hardly 
negotiable.    
It becomes clear that Philip does not want a lasting peace with anyone; 
whereas the Greek cities, including the Athenians, have deluded them-
selves that he is offering them peace. That’s why the mood becomes more 
pessimistic from the First Philippics onwards, although Demosthenes con-
tinues to speak on the necessity of the resistance and points to the proper 
measures to be undertaken. However, his attention splits: on the one side 
he speaks about the coordinate actions between the cities and the organi-
zation of the resistance, but on the other he is more frequently ruminating 
on the topic: ‘Why this happened?’ 
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A Step Aside 
Today Europe is not threatened by an over-ambitious conqueror as Philip, 
neither so much by the Islamist terrorism, but rather by the fear, that ‘the 
things are not going as earlier.’ Indeed, it is difficultly believable that 
peoples will become richer and richer, and this will go on endlessly. Al-
ways comes a moment, when their wealth and even their culture begin to 
raise the interest of the neighbors. Then comes the time to act. And indeed 
Europe acts through its present day leaders, but some of the effects lead to 
undesirable changes (people do not merely get richer; sometimes other 
things happen) and the discontent appears. It is this discontent, caused by 
the fear that is the real enemy of Europe today. And due to the fact that 
today it seems quite strong, the politicians and the troubled citizens, just 
like Demosthenes, ask themselves both the questions: not only ‘What is to 
be done?’ but also ‘Why it happened like that?’ And if the asking of the 
latter question becomes more and more frequent, this will be a sign that 
the situation worsens. 
What are the causes for the weakness of Athens, according to Demos-
thenes? First of all, paradoxically, is the democracy itself, whose proce-
dures impede the necessary reaction of the state in critical circumstances. 
Unlike the Athenian politicians, Philip of Macedon takes all the decisions 
by himself: he commands the army, he presides the negotiations (if not he 
in person, the messengers lead them instead of him; these people would 
never dare to work in favour of another Macedonian, opponent to Philip); 
he allocates the money and is unaccountable to anyone. No one can sue 
against him; no one can interrupt him during his speeches (as happens to 
every Athenian politician); his proposals are not subjected to a vote, be-
cause he is not making proposals, he just commands. All this still does not 
mean that Demosthenes is complaining of the democracy in principle. But 
he says that there are moments, when the city should behave as one, and 
not only the city, but also all Greeks. If this does not happen, the democra-
cy itself, which cause such delays in the communal decision-making, will 
be destroyed. 
The second problem is the corruption. There are Athenian politicians, 
Demosthenes says, who are working for Philip; they are simply paid, or 
something is promised to them, or they are hope to gain power after the 
loss of the independence. However, no one can prove indisputably their 
guilt. And the people do not worry about their deeds, because they, unlike 
Demosthenes, assure the citizens, that everything goes well, that the city is 
powerful enough, and Philip is harmless; or even that he is already an 
ally. 
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Finally, the mere laziness of the Athenians is a problem; and it is 
caused by the irresponsible redistribution of the money of the state. The 
Athenians are accustomed to many feasts, which usually are visited by 
many foreigners. The mere presence of the Athenian people as audience at 
these feasts is paid by the state treasury and no one can offer these money 
to be spent on something else – for example on shipbuilding. Shortly, the 
Athenians are convinced that they live better than the rest of the Greeks 
and they are reluctant to be deprived from this social acquisition. That’s 
why they are not disposed to think that the situation is so much serious as 
Demosthenes describes it. But such a city seems sentenced to loose its po-
litical significance – and it is precisely what had happened. In the centu-
ries that followed the polises had made several attempts to gain indepen-
dence – either from Macedonia, or from Rome – but Athens didn’t take 
part in these developments and the center of resistance against foreign 
powers had moved to the south – to Corinth and the Peloponnesian cities. 
The Unity of the Greeks 
Now a few words about the different forms of unification of that occurred 
to the Greeks from the colonization times onwards. 
Firstly, the forcible union. It may come from ‘inside’ or from ‘outside’.  
From ‘inside’ means that one of the polises succeeds to subdue the ma-
jority or all of the Greek cities, to create a union and then, by war or di-
plomacy, to keep its power. This never happened, except of the cases with 
1. The coalitions, presided by Athens and Sparta, and 2. the ephemeral 
dominations of Sparta and Thebes during the IV century.  
Analogically, modern Europe does not remember such a union, al-
though in certain periods the power of France, Germany, Russia and even 
Turkey had been really great and jeopardizing for the rest.  
  Then, the unification from outside. Such unification seems to have oc-
cured at the end of the classical epoch with the Macedonian invasion. Phi-
lip II was considered ‘a barbarian’ by some Greeks like Demosthenes (3 
Philippic, 31). It is certain that he thought of himself at least as a semi-
Greek. He was descendant of Alexander I (498-454), who at his time had 
insisted to the organizers of the Olympic games, that he is a Greek from 
Argos - and indeed he had been recognized as such (Herodotus, V, 22). 
Obviously, sometimes it is difficult to decide whether the conqueror is 
external or internal.  
Today, for example, it is difficult, if at all possible, to discuss on the theme 
‘Are the Turks European?’ There is no influential politician in Europe who 
dares to say that Turks ‘are Asians’. In fact, the basic question is: ‘Is the EU 
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an organization for the Europeans, or it is for every state in the world who 
wishes and is able to join it? If it is only for the Europeans, who are they?’ 
Secondly, the classical Greeks could be united simply ad hoc, because of a 
war. Thucydides says that this had happened for the last time during the 
reign of Agamemnon, when practically all of the Greeks marched against 
Troy. But this happened only in deep antiquity and according to Homer; 
in the historical times however, this was not achieved, although there have 
been plenty of different military coalitions. They usually have been di-
rected against someone in Greece itself. The coalitions against Philip and 
that in the middle of II BC against Rome may be seen as exceptions – but 
even then only some of the polises participated.       
Still, there was another possibility for a unification, which had been ac-
complished to a considerable degree, and even before the time of the un-
ions, mentioned so far. This is the colonization. 
  The Greek colonization is a peaceful expansion. In this epoch there 
had been enough ‘free territories’ around the Mediterranean – free not in 
the sense of ‘uninhabited’, but in the sense of ‘lacking a state’, and conse-
quently ownership of the land. On these territories the Greeks had estab-
lished cities, but had not expelled the old population altogether, neither 
exterminated them, nor even fought against them, unless they had been 
compelled to do this. At the same time they relayed a lot on the other 
Greeks of the older polises – not only from the metropolis, but from other 
as well. And precisely this connection with other independent states with 
similar jurisdiction and similar culture, expressed in intensive trade and 
participating in communal feasts, is the unity, which the Greeks had ma-
naged to acquire.   
The Greek Model and Contemporary Europe 
What has been said so far does not presume that some situations in history 
repeat themselves exactly, and that consequently the historian is able to 
predict the future and react better than the ignorant. But the lack of posi-
tive knowledge about the future is not a reason for giving up the acting. 
Since the lack of activity entails certain consequences, it turns out to be a 
kind of activity as well. Hence, the plain non-acting, especially in politics, 
is impossible. Therefore, it is better to have an idea of the Good and to act 
according to it, relying on certain examples from the past. These examples 
are the historical experience; and being such they offer already forms of 
action, which might be taken into account. 
So, the Greek polises spread their political culture and accumulated 
their wealth during the so-called archaic epoch. During the classical epoch 
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they, with a few exceptions, did not multiply, and at the end of it they 
already lost their independence. Now we should not hurry to declare, that 
today Europe is decaying and there is nothing to be done. Still, it is 
beyond doubt, that Europe has changed rapidly through the centuries, 
and that the last of them has brought death, destruction and slavery in the 
greatest degree. And taking for granted that the process of the changing 
cannot be stopped, we should think what might be its direction.  
The confining of Europe in its present day boundaries with the conser-
vation of the ‘national identity’ is a demonstration of obstinacy, an attempt 
to stop the time. The continent is not a museum, it is a place inhabited by 
living people. The stress on the national (sometimes disguised as ‘cultur-
al’) identity, forced and simplified by the humanitarian education in the 
primary and secondary state schools, will lead to nothing better than wars. 
Hence, if we have to choose a problem, let it be the problem of the Greek 
colonization, as it is possible today – and it is an attempt of a peaceful 
multiplication of the existing political model. The place of development 
should be directed outwards. The union might not be one state, but it 
should find a way to continue its expansion and to include not only all the 
Balkans and Turkey, but also Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus’ republics, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Israel, and even the north of Africa. In return for 
the difficulties that we will encounter on this way, we will receive at least 
half a century of peace, freedom and a life with a good and serious mis-
sion.  
  
 
